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Abstract
Risk of sovereign debt default has frequently affected emerging market and de-
veloped economies. Such financial crisis are often accompanied with severe declines
of employment that are hard to justify using a standard dynamic stochastic model.
In this paper, I document that a labor wedge deteriorates substantially around swift
reversals of current accounts or default episodes. I propose and evaluate two different
explanations for these movements by linking the wedges to changes in labor taxes and
in the cost of working capital. By adding these two features in a dynamic model of
equilibrium default I am able to replicate the behavior of the labor wedge observed
in the data around financial crisis. In the model, higher interest rates are propagated
into larger costs of hiring labor through the presence of working capital. As an econ-
omy is hit with a stream of bad productivity shocks, the incentives to default become
stronger, thus increasing the cost of debt. This reduces firm demand for labor and
generates a labor wedge. A similar effect is obtained with a counter-cyclical income
tax rate policy. The model is used to shed light on the recent events of the Euro Area
debt crisis and in particular of the Greek default event.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign default crises are events usually associated with large economic costs. In
particular, countries that experience such events typically experience large drops in both
output and employment. Mendoza and Yue (2012) notes, by looking at a set of emerging
economies, that default events are associated with deep recessions where employment falls
of average by about 15% lower compared with pre-crisis levels. More recently, the same
kind of patterns have been observed in the advanced economies that were in the epicenter
of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis, namely Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. One natural
question to ask is, therefore, if the observed fall in employment in these events is unusual at
the light of standard economic theory (e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007) given an
equally large fall in output. Showing evidence suggesting that the answer to this question is
negative, this paper advances with an explanation where labor markets distortions arise as
a consequence of limited access to credit markets by governments on the onset of a sovereign
debt crisis.
To motivated the claim that labor market distortions are increasing during episodes of
sovereign default, the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis is used as a main source of empirical
evidence. One main advantage of using this set of countries resides on the availability of
high frequency data for series such as output, consumption, and employment. The data
analysis suggests that European countries that were close or defaulted during the crisis
are also the ones where the long-term, otherwise, statistically stable correlation between
employment/output growth - traditionally coined as Okum’s law (Okun, 1962) - breaks
down on the aftermath of the crisis. Additionally, using the Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan,
2007 accounting methodology, it is shown that measured labor wedges, often associated
with distortions, deteriorated much faster for countries that were more severely affected
by the debt crisis. When regressed against a set of controls, worse labor wedges wedges
are statistically associated with higher government interest rate spreads thus suggesting
a channel over which adverse government credit conditions spillover into labor market
distortions.
These empirical observations are rationalized with a dynamic stochastic model of de-
fault with endogenous labor supply. As standard in sovereign default models of the Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) type, the government has limited commitment in honoring its debt
contracts, implying that interest rates on borrowing include a premium over the risk-free
rate demanded by international investors to compensate for the risk of default. Because the
government is assumed to be impatient and debt is non-contingent, the interest rate spread
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displays a counter-cyclical as the debt burden become more onerous to the government
when the economy is in recession with a consequent fall in revenue. Given these interest
rate spread dynamics, a financial crisis is associated with sharp tightness of credit market
access triggered by a sequence of negative productivity shocks. To link these financial crises
with the labor market, the model adds two additional features. First, the government only
has access to distortionary taxation and debt to finance public consumption. This im-
plies that distortionary taxes have to be raised when access to credit markets becomes
constrained thus distorting the household labor supply decision. Second, the model also
assumes that firms are required to keep working capital to finance their salary payments.
Additional, and in line with the literature (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006;
Arellano and Kocherlakota, 2014), it is assumed that high government interest rates spill
over to high corporate interest rates. This creates an additional source of distortions on
labor markets from the demand end. In summary, both the distortionary taxation and
working capital requirements work as frictions that distort labor markets when the gov-
ernment is close to default. As a result the fall in employment is larger that what would
been without these frictions. Under this framework, default entails costs in terms of loss
productivity and financial market access. On the reserve side, repudiating debt can release
resources to both public and private consumption. At the same time, more resources also
relaxes the fiscal constraint and allows the government to stop tax increases. In every
period the government evaluates the costs and benefits of defaulting and acts accordingly.
A simulated version of this model is computed to match the economy of Greece. Several
features of the Greek business cycle moments are captured in the model. In particular
the model generates counter-cyclical interest spreads or tax rates, a characteristic usually
associated to emerging market economies (Cuadra et al., 2010; Vegh and Vuletin, 2012). In
this paper, counter-cyclical tax rates arise due to imperfect credit market access. It is also
due to these dynamics of interest and tax rates that explain the main results of the simu-
lation: on the path to default employment falls substantially and is followed by increased
distortions in the labor markets. The model accounts for a 15% decline of employment
from 3 years before default (against an observation of 17% for Greece) from which 3pp is
accounted by distortionary taxes and an additional 4pp from working capital constraints.
This paper is builds on the literature on endogenous default risk. Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), or Arellano (2008) developed sovereign default models
where the probability of default is increasing when debt is high or income low. However,
these papers assume that the government is able to transfer resources to households in a
non-distortionary fashion, thus abstract from fiscal constraints. In Cuadra et al. (2010), a
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similar model of sovereign default extended to include endogenous labor and distortionary
consumption and conclude that under imperfect credit access tax rates become counter-
cyclical. Arellano and Bai (2013) use a similar paper to obtain the result that exogenously
raising labor taxes may be self-defeating in the sense that the impact of distortions may
reduce the revenue base used by the government to repay debt. Despite these important
conclusions, neither paper attempt to quantitatively account for the labor market implica-
tions of a pro-cyclical tax policy.
Also related is the literature that uses interest rate shocks as a main source of fluc-
tuations in emerging economies. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006)
present models where firms require working capital to pay salaries in advance financed
by external debt. This imply that labor demand is reduced when interest rates are high.
An important setback of these models relies on the fact that interest rates are completely
exogenous and, for that reason, disconnected from the level of government indebtedness.
Using a model of sovereign default, Mendoza and Yue (2012), assume that some imported
inputs require working capital financing, thus providing a channel over which endogenous
interest rate fluctuations affect firms decisions. However, this paper also abstracts from
fiscal constraints and the model cannot generate a fall in labor at defaults as seen in the
data.
Finally, the literature that uses the accounting methodology developed by Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2007) to study labor market distortions as measured by labor wedges. For
example, Karabarbounis (2014), using a set of developed and emerging economies points
out the the labor wedge is in general pro-cyclical, that is, it deteriorates when output is
in recession, while Ohanian et al. (2007) regress labor wedges against a set of regressors
and conclude that labor taxes affect negatively this wedge. Neither of these authors relates
their wedges with financial crisis. An exception comes from Pratap and Quintin (2011)
that associate distortions in labor markets to increases in interest rates and tax rates in the
Mexican crisis of 1994, however, in their model, interest are exogenously determined and
taxes play no role.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents empirical
evidence on labor market distortions arising from the Euro Area debt crisis; section 3
presents a model that rationalizes such evidence; section 4 calibrates the model for the
Greek economy and run some robustness checks; and section 5 concludes. The appendix A
presents some additional evidence and describes the computational methods used.
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2 Empirical Evidence
The EZ crisis starting in 2008 is marked by a large heterogeneity in the macroeconomic
responses within each country. Table 1 shows the length and depth of the recession for
the different countries composing the European monetary union at the beginning of 20081.
It is quite evident that some countries experienced large and prolonged recessions while
others did not. For the case of Greece, the recession is even comparable to the US great
depression with a length of more that 6 years followed by a 27% fall in output and an 20pp
increase in unemployment (as in figure 1). With the exception of Italy and Slovenia where
labor markets stayed more contained, this was also the pattern observed for the other
countries that experienced prolonged recessions. Given that Greece, Portugal, Ireland,
Spain all received financial assistance from official creditors, a natural question to ask is if
that recession, apart from its length depth, had any unusual features.
Table 1: 2008 Recession cycle of Euro Area countries
Peak Trough Diff ∆Y (%) ∆C (%) ∆U (pp) ∆E (pp)
Austria 2008q1 2009q2 5 -5.8 1.7 1.2 -0.5
Belgium 2008q2 2009q1 3 -4.2 -0.6 1.1 -0.3
Germany 2008q1 2009q1 4 -6.9 1.3 -0.2 0.3
Spain 2008q2 2013q2 20 -8.0 -8.6 15.8 -9.4
Finland 2007q4 2009q2 6 -9.6 -0.4 1.9 -2.0
France 2008q1 2009q2 5 -4.0 0.8 2.0 -0.7
Greece 2007q2 2013q4 26 -27.4 -22.2 19.2 -11.0
Ireland 2007q4 2012q2 18 -9.7 -9.9 10.0 -9.9
Italy 2008q1 2014q4 27 -9.6 -5.9 6.4 -3.0
Netherlands 2008q1 2009q2 5 -4.2 0.5 0.4 0.1
Portugal 2008q1 2013q1 20 -9.6 -10.4 9.5 -8.3
Slovenia 2008q2 2012q4 18 -11.2 -2.7 5.3 -4.3
Data source: OECD. Output and consumption are OECD volume estimates. As in Harding
and Pagan (2002), peak and trough turning points are determined using the following method-
ology: (1) output is measured in logs at quarterly frequency; (2) peaks are selected when
yt = max {yt−2, yt−1, yt, yt+1, yt+2} and troughs when yt = min {yt−2, yt−1, yt, yt+1, yt+2}; (3)
censoring rules apply where peaks and troughs have to alternate and the minimum phase is 2
quarters with a 5 quarters minimum cycle.
A simple way to analyze this question is look for deviations of the historical relation-
ship between employment and output change. Figure 1 shows very clearly how output is
negatively correlated with unemployment, a well identified relationship known as Okun’s
law. Recent studies 2 indicate that such relationship has been kept strong and stable for
most countries, even after including the 2008 Great Recession. Typical analysis point that
1Luxembourg has a population of 0.5 millions and because of such small size it is not included in this
analysis.
2Examples include Ball et al. (2013) or Elsby, Hobijn, Şahin, Valletta, Stevenson, and Langan (2011).
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different linear slopes characterizing the relationship employment/output in different coun-
tries are due to different labor market frictions or market structures. However, if such
environments are invariable during the business cycles, then the slope of the relationship
absorbs such institutional features. In this sense, systematic deviations of that long-term
relationship can be indicative of a breakdown.
Figure 1: Output, consumption, and unemployment dynamics around Euro debt crises for
selected countries
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Data source: OECD. The variable y in the figures stands for the cyclical component of the quarterly GDP using an HP filter
with 1600 smooth parameter.
In order to study the impact of the European debt crisis on the stability of the Okun’s
law, figure 2 plots a scatter of employment changes against output changes. The figure
suggests that the employment has fallen faster relatively to output during the period of
2009-2014 for the countries represented at the top panels as the red dots are substantially
below the historical trend line. This indicates that over the period, for each one percent of
output drop, employment fell more than the historical average.
A structural break of the relationship can be tested using a Chow test which consists
in estimating for each country the following regression using OLS
∆Et = β0 + β1∆Yt + α0D
2008
t + α1∆Yt ·D2008t + ut
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Figure 2: Employment and output correlation for selected countries (solid circles for after
2008)
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Data source: OECD. The solid circles represent observations after 2008.
where∆Et,∆Yt, andD2008t are change in employment, change in employment, and a dummy
variable taking one when t > 2008. The test consists in evaluating the null hypothesis that
α0 = 0 and α1 = 0 using a Wald statistic. The results of applying such tests for all member
countries of the EZ can be found in table 2. Five out of 12 countries present evidence
statistical evidence that the Okun’s law has kept stable over the period. For the remaining
countries, Germany, France, and Netherlands show an improvement of the relationship in
the sense that less employment fall is associated with an 1 percent fall in output, that is,
either the slope decreases or the intercept increases. As for Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy
and Portugal, the statistical evidence supports the idea that there was a structural break
in 2009 that aggravated labor market conditions.
A different approach to inspect labor market conditions makes use of the accounting
methodology developed by Chari et al. (2007). This derives a wedge that reflects the
difference of what is observed in the data and the prediction of a neoclassical growth
model in some key variables. The difference measured in the wedge accounts for unknown
factors that are unaccounted by a frictionless standard economic model. Specifically, the
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Table 2: Okun’s Law structural break
Before 2009 After or 2009 Chow
b1 b0 R
2 N b1 b0 R
2 N (p-val)
Austria 0.20 0.005 0.20 52 0.23 0.006 0.69 25 0.47
Belgium 0.55 -0.002 0.31 48 0.30 0.002 0.37 24 0.25
Germany 0.37 0.000 0.26 56 0.05 0.005 0.06 24 0.00
Spain 1.34 -0.009 0.65 36 1.50 -0.012 0.96 24 0.71
Finland 0.29 0.00 0.14 40 0.27 0.00 0.52 24 0.12
France 0.72 -0.005 0.77 56 0.50 -0.002 0.89 25 0.01
Greece 0.12 0.010 0.03 56 0.79 -0.005 0.59 24 0.00
Ireland 0.42 0.014 0.46 56 0.70 -0.018 0.55 24 0.00
Italy 0.19 0.010 0.18 40 0.16 -0.004 0.19 24 0.00
Netherlands 0.49 0.003 0.40 40 -0.24 -0.006 0.15 24 0.00
Portugal 0.46 -0.002 0.48 40 0.68 -0.012 0.58 24 0.01
Slovenia 0.26 -0.005 0.08 52 0.05 -0.010 0.03 23 0.04
Notes: Data source OECD. The coefficients b1 and b0 are the slope and intercept coefficient
of the corresponding regressions. A standard dummy variables method is used to preform the
Chow’s test assuming the break occurs at the first quarter of 2009.
methodology presents a labor market equilibrium equation of the form:
ult/uct = ωt · yt/ht (1)
where ult and uct are the marginal utility of labor and consumption at time t; yt the
output, ht hours; and ωt represents the labor wedge. Because different utility functions
have different functional forms, the wedge measurement will also differ. In practice, for this
exercise, the two most widely used utility functions in the literature are chosen3:
uCRRA(c, h) =
c1−σ
1− σ − Γ ·
h1+γ
1 + γ
uGHH(c, h) =
(
c− Γ · h
1+γ
1 + γ
)1−σ
/ (1− σ)
Applying these utility functions to (1) imply the following wedges measurement:
ωˆCRRAt = (1 + γ)ht − yˆt + σcˆt
ωˆGHHt = (1 + γ)ht − yˆt
where a variable with an hat represents a log deviation from steady state4.
3The parameters σ, γ, and Γ regulate an economic agent’s preferences for consumption and hours of
work.
4Specifically, for a level variable x, xˆt = log xt − log x¯t and x¯t is trend component of xt at time t.
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Figure 3: Labor wedges for selected countries
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Figure 3 measures the cyclical component of these labor wedges for a subset of countries
in the EZ for a particular choice of the parameter values5. Both measures indicate that
countries in the EZ were differently affected by the recession. One can easily see that the
wedges deteriorated substantially for countries such as Greece, Portugal, or Ireland, while
were very stable for Germany, Finland, or Austria. This observation seem to suggest that
the severity of the financial crisis may be responsible for the adverse behavior in labor
markets. To better understand what is driving the labor wedge, the following panel data
regression is estimated for every quarter t and every country i from the EZ:
ωˆit = βi + βt + β1yˆit−1 + β2spreadit−1 + uit
where spreadit is the spread between the 10 year government yield of country i and Ger-
many for the quarter t. This variable is used as a proxy for the country specific severity
of the financial crisis. Table 3 shows the results. Across specifications and for both wedge
measures, the results are consistent at showing that the labor wedge is negatively correlated
5The parameter values are σ = 2 and γ = 0.5, which are exactly the same as the ones used in section
4, and close to the ones used, for example, in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
9
with both the interest rate spread and the output gap. The last result is consistent with
previous studies (Karabarbounis, 2014) and simply states that the labor wedge is coun-
tercyclical. The results also show a negative correlation between the labor wedge and the
domestic financial conditions as captured by the interest rate spread. These, suggest that
times of large spreads are associated with labor markets that are more distorted and are
also consistent with the results presented in tables 1 and 2. That is, the unusual drop in
employment, observed mainly in southern European countries and Ireland, may be related
with the sharp increase in interest rate motivated by a sovereign debt crisis.
Table 3: Labor wedge panel regressions
CRRA GHH
interest rate spread -0.78** -0.80** -0.23** -0.19**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
output gap -0.69** -0.40** -0.65** -0.40**
(0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
time effects No Yes No Yes
N 569 569 569 569
R2 0.17 0.34 0.18 0.31
Notes: Data source OECD and ECB. All regressions are estimated using fixed
effects and the standard errors, presented in parenthesis, are heteroskedastic
robust. The statistical models without fixes constrains βt = 0 for all t. ∗∗
significance at 1%; ∗significance at 5%.
3 Model Economy
The previous section suggests that labor markets and credit access are closely related.
Here, a typical sovereign default model is presented to account for that relationship. The
model economy is one based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) where a sovereign government
borrows or saves from international markets in order to maximize consumers utility. Be-
cause the government cannot commit to honor its debts contracts, international investors
demand an interest rate premium over the risk free rate to account a default probability.
The main departure from the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) model resides on the labor mar-
ket. On one hand consumers supply labor based on the income tax rate determined by the
government. On the other hand, firms demand labor under a working capital constrain.
The first feature links labor supply to credit conditions as a debt constrained government,
in need to finance public expenditure, has to increase taxes that distorts consumers de-
cisions. As for the second feature, under the assumption that higher government interest
rates spillover to corporate higher interest rates, then, due to the working capital constrain,
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harsher credit conditions affects firms inducing them to hire less labor. The details of this
model are outlined in the following sections.
3.1 Household
A representative household is infinitely lived, valuing consumption and labor accordingly
to:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht) (2)
where E is the expectation operator, β denotes the discount factor, and the period
utility u : R+ × [0, 1] → R is: continuous, differentiable and concave in both arguments;
increasing in c and decreasing in h. Maximization of lifetime utility (2) is subjected to the
following budget constraint:
ct = (1− τt) · (wtht + pit + et) (3)
Consumption ct equals income provided by wage income derived from supplying ht hours
at a wage rate of wt, firms’ profits pit and interest earnings et, all income taxed at rate
τt. Optimality from maximization of (2) subjected to (3) imply the following first order
condition:
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ht
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ct
= (1− τt)wt (4)
That is, marginal rate of substitution of hours to consumption equals the wage rate net
of taxes. Equation (4) together with (3) characterize simultaneously this household labor
supply and demand for consumption goods. Similar optimality conditions were used within
the framework of sovereign default models, for example, in Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza
(2010) and Arellano and Bai (2013). Implicitly in this environment is the restriction that
the household cannot directly access external borrowing.
3.2 Firm
Final consumption goods are produced by firms using labor services as inputs. The
production function f(h) - continuous, differentiable, concave, and satisfying Inada’s con-
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ditions - is also subjected to a multiplicative stochastic productivity shock zt that follows a
Markov process. As in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) or Uribe and Yue (2006), profits equal
the difference between revenues and costs that include both the wage bill and working
capital costs. This means that in order to pay wages to workers, firms need to set aside a
fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of the wage bill immediately after the beginning of the period in order to
pay workers before the end of the the same period. However, because production is only
available at the end of the period, firms need to borrow an amount equal to θwtht from
households at a gross interest rate of Rt ≥ 16. As such, at the end of time t, profits are
given by:
pit = ztf (ht)− wtht − (Rt − 1) · θwtht (5)
It follows that profit maximization implies the following equation that characterizes
demand for labor:
wt =
1
1 + (Rt − 1) · θ · zt
∂f(ht)
∂ht
(6)
Note that the wage rate is equated to the product of the marginal product of labor and a
term bounded between 0 and 1. It follows that, from the firm’s perspective, an increase in
its cost of financing is equivalent to a negative productivity shock.
3.3 Government
The sovereign government finances public consumption using income taxes or by issuing
non-contingent new long-term debt at international markets price of qt. In order to intro-
duce long-term debt, I follow a similar approach to Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and
Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sosa-Padilla (2016) by assuming that the debt stock matures at
any given period with probability λ and, if it does, pays a coupon equal to c. This implies
that given new issuances of debt It, debt accumulates accordingly to:
Dt+1 = (1− λ)Dt + It (7)
Because of the inability of international investors to enforce contracts, the government
has the ability to repudiate its debt liabilities. However, under the case of default, the
government acquires a bad credit history and becomes excluded from borrowing for for a
random number of periods. At the end of that period the government has the option of
6A different way to interpret working capital requirements is that, due to some friction in the technology
for transferring resources, workers demand a fraction θ of the wage payment before production takes place.
For that reason, firms need to borrow in advance.
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restructuring its debt by paying a fraction ϕ of what is due. If that’s the case a good
credit standing status is regained. Also, while in financially exclusion, firms productivity is
negatively affected becoming z˜ = z − l(z) where l(z) is an increasing loss function. Given
this elements, the government budget constrain is given by:
τt · (wtht + pit + et) =gt + qt [Dt+1 − (1− λ)Dt]−Dt [λ+ (1− λ) c] if repay (8)
τt · (wtht + pit + et) =gt if default (9)
It follows that the problem for the government, when the credit history is good, resides
on choosing the tax rate τt, next period debt Dt+1, and whether or not to repay current
debt in order to maximize the household’s lifetime utility (2) subjected to equations (8)
and (9), together with (3) and (4). These last two constraints are due to the fact that
the government has no access to lump sum tax instruments and has to operate under a
competitive labor market equilibrium.
3.4 International Investors
If the government has a good credit history, then it can issue debt in international
markets where risk neutral investors charge a debt price qt that compensates them for the
opportunity cost of alternative investments with a certain rate of return of 1/q¯−1 to which
adds the risk that the government defaults on its debt. Under default, debt grows at the risk
free rate, so Dt+1 = Dt/q¯. Also under default the government receives a restructuring shock
with probability ζ that reduces the debt it owes by a fraction ϕ ∈ [0, 1] and allows it to
regain access to credit markets. Letting I(D, z) be an indicator function taking 1 whenever
the government decides to default, then international investors price new issuances of debt,
qt ≡ q (Dt+1, zt), accordingly to:
qt =q¯
∫ {
(1− It+1) (λ+ (1− λ) (c+ qt+1)) + It+1qdeft+1
}
dF (zt+1|zt) (10)
where F (zt+1, |zt) is the process governing productivity, qt+1 ≡ q (Dt+2, zt+1) is the bond
price in the following period without default, and qdeft+1 ≡ qdef (Dt+1/q¯, zt+1) is the bond
price under default, defined recursively as:
qdeft =q¯
∫ {
(1− ζ) qdeft+1 + ζϕ
(
(1− It+1) [λ+ (1− λ) (c+ q˜t+1)] + It+1q˜deft+1
)}
dF (zt+1|zt)
(11)
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and q˜t+1 ≡ q [ϕDt+1/q¯, zt+1] is the price of restructured debt under repayment, while q˜deft+1 ≡
qdef [ϕDt+1/q¯, zt+1] is the price of restructured debt under default.
The debt price schedule (10) is composed of 3 main elements: the first one, q¯, is the
price for risk-free investments; the second,
∫
[1− It+1] dF (zt+1, |zt), is the probability that
the government honors the contract; and the last,
∫ [
It+1qdeft+1
]
dF (zt+1, |zt), reflects the
expected recovery rate of an international investor. That recovery depends on the parameter
ϕ.
Finally, as pointed by Hatchondo et al. (2016), models with long-term debt and positive
recovery rate can give the government incentives to issue large amounts of debt just before
defaulting, which could allow for a large increase in consumption. These authors solve this
issue by preventing the government from issuing debt at certain low prices. In this model,
the same kind of restriction is used where the government cannot issue new debt at a price
lower than q. In the calibration section, a value of q is chosen such that this constraint is
rarely binding, and still allows for debt issuances at the sovereign spreads that are observed
in the data.
3.5 Recursive Formulation
The timing of events for a government with good credit history is summarized as fol-
lowing:
• the government enters a period t with debt Dt and productivity zt is realized and
observed.
• if the government decides to repay maturing debt λDt and the coupons on non-
maturing debt (1− λ) cDt, it then chooses current tax rate τt, and new debt issuances
It to finance public consumption gt.
– at the beginning of the period, households decide on labor supply and firms
on labor demand. Labor market equilibrium implies that for a wage rate wt,
hst = h
d
t = ht. Simultaneously, households also decide on their consumption
schedules.
– production follows and, towards the end of the period, profits pit and interest
earnings et = (Rt − 1) · θwtht are transferred to the household and consumption
follows.
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– next period t + 1 the government keeps its good credit history and starts the
period with Dt+1.
• if the government decides to default then credit history becomes bad, productivity
suffers a loss equal to l(zt) and the government chooses taxes τt to finance gt.
– a similar chain of events as above determines consumption and labor, ct and ht
respectively.
– while in default the government’s debt accumulates interests at the risk-free rate:
Dt+1 = Dt/q¯.
– with probability ζ the government receives a debt restructuring shock and it’s
current debt is reduced by ϕ. The government can decide to repay that new
amount of debt, thus regaining a good credit history, or to remain in default.
The remaining object to be define is the interest rate firms face regarding their working
capital requirements. As in existing models of business cycles for small open economies
with working capital (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005, Uribe and Yue, 2006, or Mendoza and
Yue (2012)), the interest rate that affects firms is a function of the interest rate on sovereign
debt:
R = m (1/q) (12)
where m is an increasing function.
The structure described above implies that the government’s problem admits a recursive
formulation, where (2) is maximized subjected to equations (4) to (10). Letting v(D, z) be
the value of the government with good credit history, then the problem can be represented
as
v(D, z) = max
I∈{1,0}
{
(1− I) · vrep(D, z) + I · vdef (z)} (13)
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where the value of repayment is defined as7:
vrep (D, z) = max
D′≥0,τ
{u(c, h) + βEz [v(D′, z′)]} (14)
st
c = (1− τ) · (wh+ pi + e)
pi = zf (h)− wh− (R− 1) · θwh
e = (R− 1) · θwh
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= (1− τ)w
w =
1
1 + θ (R− 1) · zfh(h)
τ · (wh+ pi + e) = g +D [λ+ (1− λ) c]− q(D′, z) · [D′ − (1− λ)D]
R = m (1/q(D′, z))
Note that, because the government decides on debt and taxes under a labor market equi-
librium8, once new debt is chosen, taxes become determined by (8). Also, constraints in
(14) can be substituted into one and another yielding, after some algebra, a simplified
representation:
vrep (D, z) = max
D′
{u(c, h) + βEz [v(D′, z′)]} (15)
st
c = zf (h)− g + Ψ′ (16)
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= zfh(h) ·
1− g−Ψ′
zf(h)
1 + θ (m [1/q(D′, z)]− 1) (17)
where Ψ′ = q(D′, z) · [D′ − (1− λ)D]−D [λ+ (1− λ) c] are net external inflows. Equation
(16) can be interpreted as the usual resources constraint, and (17) as an implementability
constraint.
7uc(c, h), uh(c, h), and fh(h) stands for
∂u(c,h)
∂c ,
∂u(c,h)
∂h , and
∂f(h)
∂h respectively
8That is, it represents the set of competitive allocations (c, h) such that both consumers and firms are
optimizing given prices and taxes.
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Similarly, the value of default is defined as:
vdef (D, z) = u(c, h) + βEz
[
ζ · v(ϕ (D/q¯)D/q¯, z′) + (1− ζ) vdef (D/q¯, z′)] (18)
st
c = [z − l(z)] f (h)− g (19)
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= [z − l(z)] fh(h) ·
1− g
[z−l(z)]f(h)
1 + θ (m [1/qdef (D/q¯, z)]− 1) (20)
3.6 Recursive Equilibrium
With the above model economy description, a Markov Perfect Equilibrium can be de-
fined. This is an equilibrium notion requiring that, at every possible state, agents’ beliefs
over other agents are specified. Given these beliefs, each agent must choose actions that are
the best responses to the strategies of the other agents. The government and international
investors only use stationary Markov strategies.
Definition 1. A recursive equilibrium is a set of:
i) Value function: v(D, z)
ii) Debt price functions: q(D′, z) and qdef (D′, z)
such that
a) Given the debt price functions q(D′, z) and qdef (D′, z), the value function v(D, z) solves
the government problem (13)
b) Given the value function v(D, z), the debt price functions q(D′, z) and qdef (D′, z) are
consistent with the lenders zero profit condition in (10).
Condition (a) requires that the government’s default and borrowing decisions are opti-
mal given the debt price schedule. Condition (b) requires the equilibrium debt prices that
determine country risk premia to be consistent with optimal lender behavior. Moreover,
given that allocations satisfy equations (4) to (10), then these are are consistent with a com-
petitive equilibrium in the labor market and satisfy the economy’s resources constraint. A
solution to this recursive equilibrium includes solutions for new debt D′(D, z), consumption
c(D, z), hours h(D, z), taxes τ(D, z), and default sets I(D, z).
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4 Calibration and Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative implications of the model outlined are studied using numerical sim-
ulations at a quarterly frequency and using a baseline calibration. In order to proceed in
that way, different functional forms are selected.
4.1 Functional Forms
The household utility function is a GHH after Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman
(1988) and has a long tradition in literature studying business cycles in small open economies
(Mendoza, 1991; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). This utility func-
tion has the advantage of shutting down the wealth effect on labor supply, therefore shocks
in the productivity process have an output response of the same signal. This is of particular
relevance for the presence exercise that focus on labor response to a sovereign default cri-
sis. For example, with a common CRRA utility function9, a strong negative income shock
would generate a counter-factual increase in labor supply due to strong wealth effects. For
that reason, instead, the following function is used:
u(c, h) =
1
1− σ ·
(
c− Γ h
1+γ
1 + γ
)1−σ
(21)
For the productivity loss function under default l(z), a non-linear specification that is
increasing with the the level of productivity:
l(z) = max {0, z − d1} (22)
implying that for defaults that occur with z > d1, the loss penalty becomes proportional
to the productivity. This functional form is similar to the one used in Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2012) or in Arellano (2008). These authors showed that an increasing loss
function in productivity is important to generate realistic default frequencies10. Such loss
function enables some additional contingency to the government by penalizing less severely
if a default occurs in a low productivity state of the world. The model proposed by Mendoza
and Yue (2012) endogenizes this loss function using a model of trade credit.
As for the gross interest rate on working capital, a simple identity function is used for
9A constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function has the following functional form: u(c, h) =
c1−σ/ (1− σ)− Γh1+γ/ (1 + γ).
10This is in contrast with a proportional one as, for example, in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).
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the equivalent zero coupon rate r˜ associated with the long-term bond with price q:11
R = m (1/q) = 1 + [λ+ (1− λ) (c+ q)] /q
Note that different models of small open economies with working capital (Neumeyer and
Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006) assume that interest rates on sovereign debt and working
capital are equal. Here, the same assumption is made. In Mendoza and Yue (2012),
it is argued that the strong correlation between the two interest rates emerge since the
government can confiscate firm repayments at default. Arellano and Kocherlakota (2014)
finds evidence of positive co-movement between private and sovereign interest rates. Also,
in the appendix A.1, some evidence for Euro Area countries is provided where, using the
interest rates for new loans to non-financial corporations as a proxy of corporate interest
rates, it is showed that this correlation can be as large as 0.83 for the case of Greece.
Finally, the productivity process is modeled as a log-normal AR(1), with
log z′ = ρz log z + ′ , ′ ∼ N(0, σz)
The numerical computation of the model uses value function iteration with finite element
method, where optimal policies are search using grid search. Details of the algorithm used
can be found in the appendix A.2.
4.2 Model Calibration
The model is computed at a quarterly frequency targeting the Greek economy for some
key data moments. As already mentioned, Greece provides a recent example of the dra-
matic impact of of a financial crisis on labor markets. Greece announced its default in the
last quarter of 2011 and, between 2009 and 2012, the unemployment rate jumped from
7.96% to 22.1%, a 14.2pp increase while, during the same period, real GDP fell by 16.3%.
Mendoza and Yue (2012) shows that these observations are not uncommon for previous
default episodes on emerging economies. High frequency data readily available provides an
additional advantage of focusing this study to Greece.
With the numerical solution at hand, the model is then used to interpret the macroeco-
nomic dynamics of variables of interest around default, such as output, consumption, and
labor, while other features of simulated economy closed with other features of the observed
11As shown in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), that interest rate can be found by solving 1 + r˜ =
[λ+ (1− λ) (c+ q)] /q.
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data. Observed data for output, consumption, employment, and trade balance are season-
ally adjusted quarterly real series obtained from OECD from 1990 to 2015. Government
debt is taken from the Eurostat. The tax series, also taken from the Eurostat, refers the
annual average income tax of a single person with no children and 100% of the average
income received by a worker in Greece. Output and consumption are in logs while trade
balance is presented as a percentage of GDP. All series are filtered using a Hodrick–Prescott
filter with a 1600 smooth parameter with the exception of the yearly tax series that uses
100.
The fixed parameters used in the calibration can be found in table 4. The risk aversion
on consumption σ = 2 is adopted from Uribe and Yue (2006). The Frisch elasticity of
1/γ = 2 is higher than some used in the literature however is not uncommon to see even
larger values be some authors12. In the above model, a large Frisch elasticity enables to
model to generate a strong response of labor supply to shocks affecting the marginal product
of labor13. The labor income share of 0.5 is taken directly from averaging one of AMECO’s
adjusted wage share series. Parameter ζ = 0.083 (Richmond and Dias, 2009) implies an
average market exclusion of 3 years and is consistent with evidence presented in Gelos,
Sahay, and Sandleris (2011) finding that debt restructuring have become faster in recent
decades. Given that evidence is scarce on the importance of working capital, previous values
used in the literature are used for guidance on the determination of θ. Because Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) uses a value of 1 and Mendoza and Yue (2012) of 0.7, an intermediate value
of θ = 0.85 is used in the model’s calibration implying that firms hold about 3.5 months of
wages in working capital. The parameter ϕ that governs the international lenders in case
of default is set to 0.5, which is in accordance with the restructuring observed in the Greek
default as documented by Zettelmeyer et al. (2013). The parameter Γ is calibrated to deliver
a mean labor supply in the model of 1 (normalized) and the government consumption g is
set to generate a relative government consumption to GDP of 20%, as observed on average
on Greece. Finally the parameters governing debt issuance are set in the following way:
Germany’s yield is used to set the risk-free debt price to q¯ to 0.995, targeting an annual rate
of 2%; the maturity parameter λ captures an average 7.4 years debt maturity as reported
by the Eurostat; the debt coupon c is normalized to be 1 − q¯ so as to deliver a maximum
debt price of q¯14; and the minimum issuance debt price is set to 0.65 which prevents the
12Shimer (2009), uses a Frisch elasticity of 4 in his model in order to justify some large labor movements
in some European countries.
13Note that with a Frisch elasticity of 0, changes in the marginal product of labor would imply no change
in hours supplied.
14The maximum debt price, that is, when the probability of repayment is certain, is given by qmax =
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government from issuing debt at interest rates larger than 11%15.
Table 4: Fixed parameter values
Parameter Value Target
Risk aversion on consumption σ 2 (standard in the literature)
Inverse Frisch elasticity γ 0.5 (standard in the literature)
Risk free debt price q¯ 1/1.005 Germany’s government interest rate
Minimum issuance debt price q 0.65 Maximum annual issuance interest rate of 11%
Output elasticity of labor α 0.5 Labour income share in GDP
Redemption probability ζ 0.083 12 quarters of market exclusion
Share of working capital θ 0.85 (standard in the literature)
Recovery parameter ϕ 0.5 Greek 50% debt restructuring
Debt maturity λ 0.034 Greek debt maturity of 7.4 years
Government consumption g 0.2 Greek 20% government consumption to GDP
Labor disutility Γ 0.4 Mean labor supply of 1
All the remaining 4 parameters {β, σz, ρz, d1} are jointly estimated using simulated
method of moments where the following data statistics are targeted: standard deviation
and autocorrelation of output; the ratio of the standard deviation of trade balance with
respect to the standard deviation of output; and interest rate spread standard deviation.
The results of this estimation process can be found in tables 5 and 6.
Table 5: Estimated parameter values
Parameter Value
Discount rate β 0.9715
Standard deviation of error σz 0.005
Persistency of productivity ρz 0.95
Productivity loss d1 0.923
Some comments are in order. First, the the choice for these moments attempts to bring
some discipline to the model in the sense that the simulated economy resembles Greece.
Second, the specific the Greek default event is being targeted with the choice of some
targeted moments, namely the 50% recovery rate offered to Greek bondholder, and some
un-targeted moments such as the fall in employment16. Third, one should note that under
q¯ (λ+ (1− λ) c) / (1− q¯ (1− λ)). Therefore, when c = 1− q¯, then qmax = q¯.
15The conversion of a debt price q to an annual interest rate rannual is given by the following expression:
rannual = [1 + (λ+ (1− λ)c− λq)/q]4 − 1.
16This choice for the recovery rate and the evaluation of the employment fall are not that far from the
ones observed in the history of sovereign default. Benjamin and Wright (2009) document that on average
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default, the government interest rate is given by equation (11), which implies an annualized
corporate interest rate of 23% under the model simulation, consistent with the evidence
from the 2002 Argentinean default where the average lending rate and deposit rate increased
to above 50% (Arellano and Kocherlakota, 2014). Finally, as can be seen in the top panel of
table 6, the simulated moments are in quite close to the data targets although the difference
is not exactly zero.
Table 6: Targeted and non-targeted moments: simulation and data
Targeted moments Data Model
standard deviation of output stdev(y) 1.9 1.9
autocorrelation of output corr(yt, yt−1) 0.80 0.79
standard deviation of the spread stdev(ispread) 1.6 1.6
relative volatility of trade balance to output stdev(TB/Y )/stdev(y) 0.4 0.4
Non-targeted moments
relative volatility of consumption to output stdev(c+ g)/stdev(y) 1.2 1.3
correlation of output with trade balance corr(TB/Y, y) -0.45 -0.74
mean spread mean(ispread) 3.2% 2.3%
correlation of output with spread corr(y, ispread) -0.58 -0.79
correlation of trade balance with spreads corr(TB/Y, ispread) 0.44 0.65
correlation of employment with spread corr(ispread, h) -0.74 -0.76
correlation of employment with tax rate (annual) corr(τ, h) -0.49 -0.89
correlation of output with tax rate (annual) corr(τ, y) -0.37 -0.78
employment drop from 3 years before default mean(ht/ht−12)− 1 -17% -15%
Mean debt to output (annual) mean(D/Y ) 110% 42%
Default rate (annual) default rate 1-4% 2.5%
Notes: data from OECD, ECB, and Eurostat and refers to Greece. The quarterly data spans from 1994 to 2012
in order to exclude the default period. All data series are log-detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with
a smoothing parameter of 1600 for quarterly data and of 100 for yearly data (the trade balance is detrended
in levels). The interest spread spread is computed using the yield long-term government bonds in Greece and
Germany. The model statistics are calculated using 50 simulation samples, each with 3000 periods (quarters).
Table 6 presents the simulation results for both targeted and non-targeted moments.
The model maintain most of the discipline imposed by the targeted moments. Within
the non-targeted moments, it should be underlined that the model is able to generate a
fall in employment of the same magnitude as observed in the data. A large degree of
proximity with the observed data is also achieved along the typical moments that are
usually studied in the literature. In particular, volatility of consumption is larger than
output and both spreads and trade balance are negatively correlated with output. Given
recovery rates amount to about 60% and Mendoza and Yue (2012) present evidence showing that, on
average, employment is 15% lower than in the three years prior to default events.
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the focus of the model on other features, such as employment and taxes, moments regarding
these dimension, usually not analyzed in previous literature, can also be computed. The
results shows that, at least qualitatively, the model mimics well the data observations. In
particular, tax rates are counter-cyclical and also negatively associated with employment.
The default rate is in line with other studies of sovereign default, with a non-targeted annual
frequency of 2.5%. The main discrepancy in this calibration is related with the average debt
to output where the model generates 42% while in the data shows that Greece has a level
of government debt of more that 100% of output. With this respect, Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) extend the Lucas example to show that financial autarky is not a harsh punishment
enough to sustain large amounts of debt in equilibrium, so the results from the simulation
are not inconsistent with those findings.
These results indicate that austerity policies, that is, tax policies that tend to aggravate
output fluctuations, are a consequence rather than an active choice policy of governments.
When an economy is hit by a recession, harder credit conditions forces a government to
increase tax rates under an impossibility of reducing public consumption. Such increases
affect negatively consumers that respond by lowering their market supply of labor. Since
firms are also exposed to similar credit conditions as the government, they also reduce labor
demand when faced with higher interest rates. Note that these adverse effects would not be
present under an alternative economy without working capital constraints and where lump
sum fiscal policies are available to the government. Thus, such movements in hours can be
interpreted as a labor wedge that falls when the economy is in recession. Under a default
event, the effects previously described become even more pronounced.
4.3 Policy and Impulse Response Functions
To facilitate the the understanding of the mechanism underlying the results presented
in the previous section, figure 4 plots the computed model policy and debt price functions,
as well as the default set. The figure shows that new debt issuances, as defined in equation
(7), is a decreasing function of current debt but increasing in productivity; the debt price
schedule is downward sloping in current debt and increasing with productivity. This reflect
the fact that indebted governments have higher probability of default, and this probability
is smaller when the economy is growing (as depicted in the right panel of figure 4).
Alternatively, impulse response functions can be plotted to analyze the optimal govern-
ment policy when the economy is hit by external shocks. Figure 5 shows the economy’s
response when the productivity suddenly drops by 1.5% from its average.
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Figure 4: Policy functions, price schedules, and default set
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions when productivity falls by 1.5%
 0.94
 0.95
 0.96
 0.97
 0.98
 0.99
 1
 1.01
 0  5  10  15  20
z
y
 0.91
 0.92
 0.93
 0.94
 0.95
 0.96
 0.97
 0.98
 0.99
 1
 1.01
 0  5  10  15  20
h
c
 1.66
 1.68
 1.7
 1.72
 1.74
 1.76
 1.78
 1.8
 1.82
 1.84
 0  5  10  15  20
b/y
 0.2
 0.202
 0.204
 0.206
 0.208
 0.21
 0.212
 0.214
 0  5  10  15  20
g/y
 0.215
 0.22
 0.225
 0.23
 0.235
 0.24
 0.245
 0.25
 0  5  10  15  20
tau
 0.04
 0.045
 0.05
 0.055
 0.06
 0.065
 0.07
 0.075
 0.08
 0.085
 0.09
 0  5  10  15  20
i
24
One first observation is that, although productivity falls by 1.5%, output falls by about
5%. This happens due to an endogenous response of labor that retraces by about 6%. The
figure also shows that, in response to the fall in productivity, the government increases
the tax rate from 21.5% to 24.5%. Additionally, on impact, the interest rate increases
substantially and that is due to the fact that, given the current debt level, the government
is more likely to enter in default. Because of this price increase, the government tries
to reduce its debt exposure allowing for a normalization of the interest rates during the
subsequent periods. The gradual reduction in the interest rates, lowers the working capital
costs for firms, allowing them to increase production. This expansion increases the taxation
base which also allows the government to reduce tax rates.
To better understand the effect of taxes and the interest rate spreads on labor dynamics,
note that equation (4) and (6) can be combined into the following expression:
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ht
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ct
= (1− τt) 1
1 + (Rt − 1) · θ · zt
∂f(ht)
∂ht
Which can be re-written as:
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ht
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ct
= ωt · zt∂f(ht)
∂ht
(23)
Here ωt is a labor wedge: the combined distortion of income taxes and working capital
constraints on the labor market equilibrium. Applying a log-linearization to (23) near the
values (τ¯ , R¯) implies:
ωˆt = − τ¯
1− τ¯ τˆt −
θR¯
1 +
(
R¯− 1) θ Rˆt (24)
where the first term in the right hand side is the contribution of the income tax to changes
in the wedge and the second term is contribution of the interest rate. Such decomposition
is depicted in figure 6 when productivity z drops 1.5%. One can see that from the almost
5% fall in the labor wedge, 4% can be accounted due to an increase in the income tax while
1% is due to an increase of interest rates through working capital constraints. One can
conclude that both channels play an important role to explain the magnitude of the labor
wedge.
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Figure 6: Labor wedge and contributions when productivity falls by 1.5%
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4.4 Event Analysis - the Greek crisis
To evaluate the performance of the model, the Greek recent crisis is used as an event
analysis. That is, the Greek GDP path between 2006-2012 is used to feed the simulated
model using a sequence of productivity shocks {zt}. In this sense, the GDP path of the
model is matched to what is observed in the data and the remaining variables series, not
targeted directly, can be evaluated. The result of this exercise can be seen in figure 7.
The figure plots, for both data and model, time series for GDP, hours17, the interest
rate spread for government bonds, and the tax rate18. In the model, a default is triggered
on the 1st quarter of 2011, 2 quarters earlier from the default event observed during in the
Greek crisis19.
17Due to data limitations, Greek employment is being used in this panel and any fluctuations in average
hours is not being considered.
18The tax series is taken from the Eurostat and refers the annual average income tax of a single person
with no children and 100% of the average income received by a worker in Greece. To increase comparability
the model counterpart averages the generated tax rate for the same years.
19It should be noted however that before the its default event, Greece negotiated a bailout rescue loan
with the IMF and the European Union institutions in the 2nd quarter of 2010. Without such loan it is
uncertain if the government would be able to honor its debt obligations.
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Figure 7: Model and data time series for the Greek crisis
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Notes: The shaded area in gray corresponds to a default period generated in the model, while the pattern shaded area
corresponds to the Greek economy default period.
The top panel of the figure shows that the model can capture well the evolution of GDP
during the Greek crisis with the exception of a few periods around the default decision.
This is because of the productivity loss function (22) that is used. With this function,
when a default occurs, productivity drops immediately to d1, reducing the flexibility of the
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model to match the output path. That is also why employment, the interest rate spread,
and the tax rate jump at the precise default quarter. The second panel in the figure shows
that the employment time series path of the model captures the same dynamics that are
observed in the data. The last two panels shows the main drivers of these dynamics. Both
the interest rate spread and the tax rate are increasing in the model as well in the data.
The government in the model has to raise taxes to finance an inelastic public expenditure
thus affecting the household supply of labor. At the same time, the prevalence of negative
productivity shocks affects the sovereign ability to fulfill its debt obligations, implying that
interest rates continue to increase and that, in turn, affects firms given their working capital
requirements. These movements combined add pressure on labor markets that subsequently
collapse at default with a 15% fall in hours when compared with pre-crisis values.
Figure 8: Labor wedge time series in the model simulation
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Notes: The shaded area in gray corresponds to a default period generated in the model, while the pattern shaded area
corresponds to the Greek economy default period.
As mentioned before, both the effects of the interest rate spread and taxes affect nega-
tively the labour market. It should be noted that such impact is on top of an already adverse
path of successive negative productivity shocks. Contrary to a situation where, with full
access to credit markets, a government facing a recession would lower distortionary taxes
(Lucas and Stokey, 1983), tax rates are countercyclical in this model. Limited commit-
ment in debt contracts implies that the interest rate is increasing when the economy is
in recession. Because credit markets become more restricted the government is forced to
raise taxes. This provides a channel between the possibility of government default and labor
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market distortions induced by countercyclical tax and interest rates as shown in the bottom
panels of figure 7. Using the measure of labor market distortion introduced in equations
(23) and (24), figure 8 plots the labor wedge that this event analysis produces. As should
be clear, the labor wedge is decreasing, implying stronger labor market distortions, as the
Greek economy moves into default, consistent with the evidence presented in section 2.
4.5 Robustness and Experiments
In order to isolate the non-standard features of the baseline model outline before, this
section re-evaluates the baseline model under different scenarios. Three alternative versions
of the model are computed under the same calibration summarized in tables 4 and 5:
Lump sum taxation The model is recomputed assuming that the government has access
to non-distortionary tax policies. That is, the new consumer budget constraint is now
given by:
ct = (1− τ¯) · (wtht + pit + et)− Tt
where Tt is a non-distortionary tax (which can be positive or negative) and τ¯ is the
average distortionary income tax rate generated in the baseline model20. The inclusion
of τ¯ attempts to increase comparability between this version and the baseline model
by imposing the same level of average distortions in the labor markets. Given the
new consumer budget constrain, the counterparts of (16) and (17) simplify to:
c = zf (h) + q(D′, z) · [D′ − (1− λ)D]−D [λ+ (1− λ) c]− g
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
=
(1− τ¯)
1 + θ (m [1/q(D′, z)]− 1) · zfh(h)
Hence, the recursive problem of the government becomes exactly defined in the same
way as before with the only difference in the above 2 equations.
Lump sum taxation with no working capital This formulation is exactly defined as
the previous one imposing that θ = 0, that is, in firms have no working capital
requirements.
External impact of working capital In the formulation of the baseline model, the im-
pact of the the government policy choices on the working capital requirements of
firms through R is properly internalized. That is, the government understands that
20In this exercise τ¯ is calibrated to be 0.217.
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different prices for debt q affect firms decisions through different corporate interest
rates R under the function m(1/q). Under this experiment, instead, such impact
is external for the government. The recursive problem for the government becomes
(letting Ψ′ = q(D′, z) · [D′ − (1− λ)D]−D [λ+ (1− λ) c]):
vrep (D, z,R) = max
D′
{u(c, h) + βEz [v(D′, z′, R′)]} (25)
st
c = zf (h) + q(D′, z) · [D′ − (1− λ)D]−D [λ+ (1− λ) c]− g
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= zfh(h) ·
1− g−Ψ′
zf(h)
1 + θ (R− 1)
R′ = Ψ(D′, z′)
and the consistency condition R′ = Ψ(D′, z′) is such that Ψ(D, z) = m(1/q(D′, z))
where D′ (D, z) comes from the optimal debt policy of the decision-maker given the
state variables. The formulation of this problem, is analogous to Kim and Zhang
(2012) that study government default decisions when borrowing is decentralized. It
should be noted that because the government’s problem changes, so does the compu-
tational method to solve it21.
Endogenous government expenditure This experiment endogeneizes government con-
sumption. To implement it, the following utility function is used22:
u(c, g, h) =
1
1− σ ·
(
c− Γ h
1+γ
1 + γ
)1−σ
+ Υ · g
1−σ
1− σ
It follows that, after some algebra, that the recursive problem for the government can
21The formal definition of the problem and algorithm used can be found in the appendix A.3
22When this model is computed, the parameter Υ is calibrated to generate an average government to
output similar to the data.
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be summarized by (letting Ψ′ = q(D′, z) · [D′ − (1− λ)D]−D [λ+ (1− λ) c]):
vrep (D, z) = max
D′
{u(c, g, h) + βEz [v(D′, z′)]}
st
c = zf (h)− g −D + q ·D′
uh(c, g, h)
uc(c, g, h)
= zfh(h) ·
1− g−Ψ′
zf(h)
1 + θ (m [1/q(D′, z)]− 1)
uc(c, g, h) = ug(c, g, h) (26)
and a similar formulation is used for the value of default vdef . The only difference
with respect to the baseline model resides in equation (26) that simply states that
the marginal utility of private consumption equals the marginal utility of public con-
sumption.
Table 7 shows the results of the computational results of the different alternatives against
the baseline model. The results highlight the relevance of two channels introduced in this
paper to explain the large fluctuations of employment during default events. In particular,
when the sovereign has access to lump sum taxes, in the column “Lump sum”, the fall of
employment during a default is reduced by 3pp to 12%, lower than what is observed in
the data. This happens since, under such environment, the government is not pushed into
raising income taxes when the economy is in recession. For that reason, part of the tax
distortions that increase the instability in labor markets disappear and, as a consequence,
the the output volatility becomes smaller. When on top of lump sum policies, working
capital requirements are withdrawn, under column “No working capital”, the employment
drop is reduced by some additional 4pp to 8%. These effects highlight importance of the
two transmission mechanism of labor market distortions.
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Table 7: Model experiments and robustness checks
Targeted moments Data Baseline Lump sum No work cap External Endog g
stdev(y) 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.9 1.7
corr(yt, yt−1) 0.80 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.79
stdev(ispread) 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.7
stdev(TB/Y )/stdev(y) 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.6
Non-targeted moments
stdev(c+ g)/stdev(y) 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5
corr(TB/Y, y) -0.45 -0.74 -0.52 -0.47 0.74 -0.72
mean(ispread) 3.2% 2.3% 2.6% 3.0% 2.3% 2.7%
corr(y, ispread) -0.58 -0.79 -0.84 -0.81 -0.79 -0.81
corr(TB/Y, ispread) 0.44 0.65 0.66 0.58 0.67 0.69
corr(ispread, h) -0.74 -0.76 -0.89 -0.89 -0.76 -0.76
corr(τ, h) -0.49 -0.89 - - -0.89 -0.65
corr(τ, y) -0.37 -0.78 - - -0.78 -0.54
mean(ht/ht−12)− 1 -17% -15% -12% -8% -15% -11%
mean(D/Y ) 110% 42% 47% 44% 40% 42%
default rate 1-4% 2.5% 3.0% 3.6% 2.7% 3.0%
The column “External” shows that, when the working capital channel is not internalized
by government, most of the dynamics of the model are kept constant. The main difference
is that default becomes slightly more frequent23. Given the small magnitude of this effect,
it does not seem unreasonable to think that a government may not take into considera-
tion that its own borrowing decisions affect firms credit conditions, similarly to what is
implicitly assumed in previous papers that use working capital requirements to generate a
channel between interest rates and labor demand (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and
Yue, 2006)24.
Finally, in the last column of table 7, government consumption is endogeneized to allow
for the fact that government consumption usually falls during default episodes (Cuadra
et al., 2010). Qualitatively, this alternative model behaves similarly to the baseline model.
However, a few important quantitative differences should be noted. First the correlation
of the tax rate with output falls to levels more close to what is observed with the data.
This happens because, as productivity falls, both private and public consumption follow,
implying that income taxes don’t need to be raised as faster. However, this also implies that
23A similar result is found in Kim and Zhang (2012)
24Alternative parameterizations that imply larger default frequencies generate also larger differences
between the “Baseline” and the “External” models where the later generates larger default probabilities and
larger standard deviations of the spread.
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the cost of a default becomes less severe than in the baseline model and this increases the
default frequency. Given that the model preforms better in some dimensions while worse
in others, a more flexible, but also more complex approach may be necessary to properly
match the data25.
5 Conclusion
New evidence supporting the idea that financial crises, arriving in the form of sovereign
default, generate distortions in labor markets can be seen in the recent Euro Area debt cri-
sis, where countries most affected, such as Greece, Portugal, or Ireland, were also the same
where employment suffered the most dramatic reduction from pre-crisis levels. Because
standard economic theory is unable to account reasonably for these drops in employment,
an alternative explanation relies on un-modeled market distortions. Using a standard la-
bor wedge decomposition to quantify distortions, it was shown that these are positively
correlated with government interest rate spreads. Increasing government interest rates, are
in fact indicative that credit is less available. For that reason, governments need to rely
more on taxation, often distortionary, to finance public expenditures. At the same time, a
close link between government and corporate interest rates provides an additional source
of through which distortions may affect labor markets when firms are required to maintain
working capital.
This paper studied the extent to which these two channels can account for labor dy-
namics in countries affected by sovereign debt risk using a simple but realistic economic
model that highlights in a transparent and intuitive fashion the economic relationship of
these dynamics. An otherwise standard sovereign default model is augmented to include
distortionary income taxation and firm’s working capital requirements. Calibrated to match
several data moments from Greece, the model is able to deliver simulated moments that are
close to the observations from the data. In particular, the model generates an endogenous
increase in tax and interest rates when productivity falls, thus implying a deterioration
of the labor wedge. The model can account for an average 15% fall in employment with
respect to pre-crisis levels at a default event, a fall comparable to what is observed in the
data. From these 15%, 3pp can be associated with the an increase of the tax rate, and an
additional 4pp due to a spill-over of high interest rates from the government to corporations.
It can be concluded that these channels provide an important quantitative explanation for
25A potential source of additional costs of default may be related with political uncertainty that such
events produce as in, for example, Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2009).
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the labor market dynamics that precede a default event.
Because the model was purposely design to be simple, several dimensions were over-
looked that can also be important, in particular international trade. As underlined by
Gorodnichenko, Mendoza, and Tesar (2012), a sudden change in import conditions, for
example through terms of trade shocks, can impose an important adjustment cost to firms
that can be protracted. Relating sovereign debt crises with firm’s international trade condi-
tions can be a source improvement of the explanations provided in this paper, especially if
there are strong complementarities between imported goods and labor in firm’s production
function. These ideas should be integrated in future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Corporate and Sovereign Interest Rates in Greece
Using data from the ECB, two measures of interest rate spreads are used:
1. Government interest rate spreads, defined as the difference between 10 year govern-
ment bond yield of each country against Germany;
2. Corporate interest rate spreads, defined as the difference between average corporate
yields charged on new loans in each country against Germany26;
Comparisons between these 2 indicators should be cautious for a variety of reasons: govern-
ment bonds don’t have any collateral associated with it, while corporate bonds may have;
heterogeneous institutional frameworks across countries should impact the yields charged
in banks, for example, stricter enforceability laws against default should imply different
interest rates; a selection effect where only healthy firms have access to credit markets may
contaminate cross-country comparisons of corporate bond yields.
Given these caveats, the following table present simple correlations between the two
indicators for Euro Area countries
Table 8: Simple correlation between government and corporate yield spreads for 2002 to
2012
correlation 95% CI
Austria -0.305 -0.540 -0.026
Belgium -0.085 -0.358 0.201
Germany - - -
Spain 0.766 0.618 0.862
Finland -0.116 -0.384 0.171
France 0.625 0.417 0.771
Greece 0.827 0.711 0.899
Ireland 0.179 -0.107 0.438
Italy 0.684 0.498 0.809
Netherlands 0.128 -0.159 0.395
Portugal 0.865 0.772 0.922
Slovenia 0.570 0.345 0.734
Notes: data source from the ECB.
26The ECB defines these yields as a composite cost-of-borrowing indicator for new loans to non-financial
corporations (percentages per annum, rates on new business).
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A.2 Computation and Algorithm of Baseline Model
The solution of the dynamic problem follows similar papers, e.g. Hatchondo et al.
(2016), and approximates continuously the problem using b-splines of degree 3 for the state
space of D and 2nd degree b-splines for z. The code is implemented in Fortran imposing
31 grid points for the state variable z and 59 for D. The state space of D ranges between
[0; 1.5], and z is given by log z ∈
[
−6.5 · σz/
√
1− ρ2z; 6.5 · σz/
√
1− ρ2z
]
. The algorithm
uses value function iteration with the following structure:
1. Guess the value functions vrep,0(D, z) and vdef,0(z); debt price functions q0 (D′, z) and
qdef,0 (D′, z); and debt policy function D′0 (D, z)
2. Use vrep,0(D, z) and vdef,0(z) to solve (15) and (18) using a global optimizer (NEWUOA
from Powell) over the space of D:
(a) labor equilibrium is obtained using a non-linear equation solver (Brent method)
(b) the resulting functions of this maximization step are vrep,1(D, z), vdef,1(z), and
D
′1 (D, z)
3. With vrep,1(D, z) and vdef,1(z) find the optimal debt prices that are consistent with
(10): q1 (D′, z) and qdef,1 (D′, z)
4. Evaluate max
{||vrep,1(D, z)− vrep,0(D, z)| , ∣∣|vdef,1(z)− vdef,0(z)∣∣}; if it’s larger than
v iterate on (1) using vrep,0(D, z) := vrep,1(D, z), vdef,0(D, z) := vdef,1(D, z),D
′0 (D, z) =
D
′1 (D, z), q0 (D′, z) = q1 (D′, z) and qdef,0 (D′, z) = qdef,1 (D′, z) until convergence is
achieved
The maximum error allowed is ν = 10−6.
A.3 Definition and Algorithm of Model with External Impact of
Working Capital
To implement an externality from a spill-over of the government interest rate spread to
corporate interest rates, the definition of the equilibrium changes from a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium to a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium as in Kim and Zhang (2012):
Definition. A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of:
i) Value function: v(D, z,R)
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ii) Debt price function: q(D′, z)
iii) Law of motion: R′ = Ψ(D′, z′)
iv) Policy function: D′ = χ(D, z,R)
Such that
a) Given the debt price function q(D′, z) and law of motion R′ = Ψ(D′, z′), the value
function v(D, z,R) solves the government problem and yields D′ = χ(D, z,R)
b) Given the value function v(D, z,R), the debt price function q(D′, z) is consistent with
the lenders zero profit condition
c) The law of motion is consistent with firms interest rate: Ψ(D, z) = l(1/q(χ(D, z,R), z))
Noting that the consistency of the law of motion implicitly defines R as a function of
z and D, the value function v(D, z,R) can also be implicitly defined by only D and z.
Defining this function as v˜(D, z), an algorithm to solve the model can be schematized as:
1. Guess the value functions v˜rep,0(D, z), v˜def,0(z), and a function Ω0(D, z)
2. Use v˜rep,0(D, z), v˜def,0(z), and R = Ω0(D, z) to solve (25) and the update the value
of default v˜rep,1(D, z) and v˜def,1(z) using a optimizer over the space of D:
(a) labor equilibrium is obtained using a non-linear equation solver
(b) the resulting functions of this maximization step are v˜rep,1(D, z), v˜def,1(z) and
D′ = χ(D, z)
(c) compute Ω1(D, z) = l(1/q(χ(D, z), z))
3. Evaluate max
{||v˜rep,1(D, z)− v˜rep,0(D, z)| , ∣∣|v˜def,1(z)− v˜def,0(z)∣∣}; if it’s larger than
v iterate on (1) using v˜rep,0(D, z) := v˜rep,1(D, z), v˜def,0(D, z) := v˜def,1(D, z), and
Ω0 = Ω1 until converge is achieved
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